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Delegation, Accountability & Legislator Moonlighting: 
Agency Problems in Germany 
Benny Geys♣ and Karsten Mause♦
Members of parliament in many countries are legally permitted to execute (un)paid jobs in 
addition to their political mandate. It is often argued that such ‘moonlighting’ activities are 
unproblematic for the chain of democratic delegation and accountability as long as outside 
interests/earnings are disclosed to citizen-principals; the latter may then sanction (perceived) 
misconduct through the ballot box. Using principal-agent theory as an analytical framework 
and the German national parliament as a case study, this paper discusses why the 
accountability mechanisms of moonlighting disclosure and electoral control are often impaired 
in practice. We also illustrate that these concerns generalise beyond the German setting. 
 
[Revised version, 2 February 2012] 
 
 
The cohabitation of citizens and their elected representatives in a democratic society can be 
conceptualised as a relationship between principals and agents.1
 
 From the citizen-principal’s 
viewpoint, a major concern with delegating decision-making authority to the politician-agent 
then becomes how to monitor and, if necessary, sanction behaviour of the agent that is not in 
the citizens’ best interest. In this article, we analyse this need for monitoring with respect to a 
special type of behaviour that is often interpreted as a symptom of political shirking in the 
public debate,2 but not explicitly analysed in the principal-agent literature so far: 
moonlighting by parliamentarians. Moonlighting is thereby defined – following the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica – as ‘working at a second job’.3 In the present context, it should be 
understood as members of parliament (MPs) carrying out legally permitted (un)paid outside 
activities in addition to their ‘job’ as a parliamentarian. While constituting a broad definition 
covering many different types of outside activities (some MPs manage a business firm, work 
as lawyers or management consultants, are supervisory board members or trade union 
officials, write journalistic articles and books, etc.), it conforms to the common usage in both 
academic, public and legal work. 
THE PHENOMENON: MPS AS SERVANTS OF COMPETING PRINCIPALS 
 
Politicians’ moonlighting activities are often argued to benefit citizen-principals for two 
reasons. First, MPs’ outside activities bring experiences and expertise from the world outside 
into the political arena.4 This real-world experience is argued to improve the quality of public 
policies as it prevents politicians’ decision-making to take place in an ivory tower. Second, 
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outside positions/options help to make MPs economically independent.5 This is deemed 
positive as it allows elected representatives to make policy decisions to the benefit of society 
as a whole – rather than voting in line with (possibly narrow) partisan interests from a need to 
preserve ones goodwill within the party. 
Yet, others perceive moonlighting politicians as a potentially serious problem for the 
agency relationship between citizens and MPs; likewise for two key reasons. First, the time 
and effort an MP invests in carrying out a sideline job are no longer available for fulfilling her 
job as a member of parliament. To the extent that a parliamentary mandate is designed as a 
full-time job, outside activities may then generate an opportunity-cost problem and lead to a 
neglect of the duties inside parliament (due to natural limits on ones time and effort).6 Second, 
moonlighting MPs might find themselves in significant conflicts of interest during policy 
decisions.7 Imagine, for instance, an MP who holds a sideline job at, say, a private-sector 
electricity company. When a decision is due in parliament that directly affects the situation of 
this electricity provider (or the energy sector in general), the moonlighter’s self-interest, her 
citizens’ interests, her party’s interests, and the interests of the power company may well 
collide. 
As becomes very clear in the latter example, moonlighting MPs act as double/multiple 
agents or ‘servants of several masters’8 from the perspective of the principal-agent approach 
to politics.9 Put differently, and using Carey’s concept of ‘competing principals’,10 
moonlighting MPs have several principals which compete for her scarce resources in terms of 
time, energy, and attention. Such MPs are not only concerned with the demands of their 
citizen-voters and their political parties (i.e. the two principals that democratic theory sees as 
normatively acceptable) – but they may also have to consider the principals created by their 
outside careers. Although it is certainly possible that moonlighting MPs and their competing 
principals live together in a mutually beneficial arrangement, such competing relations may 
also lead to situations in which a) it is difficult or impossible for the MP to cater to all her 
principals’ demands and/or b) one of the competing principals has the impression that her 
agent shirks her duties. As a result, an MP might at some point decide to exit the relationship 
to an outside employer and/or her political party (i.e. become an ‘independent’ MP), or makes 
her outside job to her main job (i.e. leaving parliament/ exit MP-voter relationship). Also, 
parties may force MPs to curtail/exit their activities for outside interests – though, as pointed 
out, for instance, in the literatures on ‘cartel parties’, ‘Parteienstaat’ (party state) and ‘party 
patronage’, parties in office sometimes use their power to supply ‘their’ MPs with extra-
parliamentary posts (e.g. in state-owned enterprises or regulatory agencies).11 
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Following the emerging literature on moonlighting politicians,12 we focus on the potential 
effects the practice of MPs serving ‘outside employers’ might have on the agency relationship 
between citizen-principals and their parliamentary agents.13 The fundamental problem here 
lies in the occurrence of an informational asymmetry. Since moonlighting MPs are better 
informed about their sideline activities and their potential implications than individual voters, 
they might be tempted to hide conflicts of interests and/or opportunity-cost (or shirking) 
issues from their citizen-principals. To overcome this, the principal should assume an active 
role in informing herself about, and supervising the actions of, her agent. Agency theory 
indeed argues that imperfect information regarding the agent’s actions can be resolved – at 
least in part – through stricter monitoring.14 By reducing the information asymmetries 
between principal and agent, monitoring limits the ‘information rent’ that can be extracted by 
the agent.15 Under some conditions, this even makes a first-best solution – i.e. without any 
rent extraction – feasible.16 
One might at this point thus be tempted to conclude that moonlighting activities are 
probably unproblematic – and possibly even beneficial if they do bring additional real-world 
experience and economic independence (see above) – as long as there are transparency rules 
disclosing MPs’ private information about sideline jobs and the outside income generated 
therewith. In such setting, citizen-principals are offered the opportunity (i) to judge for 
themselves whether an elected representative’s outside employment is likely to impair her 
functioning in parliament, and (ii) to take this information into account when standing in front 
of the ballot box on Election Day.17 Without a well-functioning chain of disclosure, 
monitoring and – if necessary – sanctioning, however, moonlighting political agents may lack 
the necessary accountability. Using principal-agent theory as an analytical framework, in the 
remainder of this article we provide an in-depth analysis of the German case to illustrate that 
the functioning of the sketched accountability mechanisms of disclosure and ‘electoral 
control’18 is often impaired in practice. 
For this purpose, the next section explains the legal framework within which members of 
the German national parliament (Deutscher Bundestag) are allowed to execute outside 
activities, and discusses the official register of members’ interests. As citizen-principals’ 
direct monitoring activities (e.g. reading registers of members’ interests) may be impeded by 
the costs of information search (time, effort) and ‘rational ignorance’,19 we subsequently turn 
to the role of information intermediaries (journalists, watchdog organisations, researchers) in 
mitigating information asymmetries between citizens and moonlighting MPs. It will turn out 
that despite existing disclosure regulations and the availability of third-party ‘watchdog’ 
information, MPs accountability still suffers due to a number of significant limitations in such 
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arrangements. Most notably, official disclosures do not reveal whether moonlighting affects 
individual legislators’ parliamentary duties, and German legislators need not disclose the full 
extent of their outside earnings; as we will see, similar shortcomings also appear in other 
parliaments: for instance, the Austrian Nationalrat and the European Parliament. Finally, we 
discuss what further changes of the rules of the moonlighting game might be desirable from 
an agency-theory perspective. 
 
 
CITIZEN-PRINCIPALS’ MONITORING OPPORTUNITIES 
 
There are different ways to deal with moonlighting parliamentarians. A laissez-faire approach 
would simply be to trust that MPs do not engage in outside activities detrimental to their 
parliamentary job. MPs’ worries about their reputational capital20 might thereby work as a 
safeguard against misconduct. Also, political competition might, if intense enough, force MPs 
to ‘police’ themselves by pointing out cases of (perceived) misconduct committed by their 
fellow MPs.21 However, following the famous dictum ‘trust is good, control is better’ 
(attributed to Vladimir Ilyich Lenin), many parliaments around the world have introduced 
disclosure rules and registers of members’ interests to make MPs’ outside interests more 
transparent for the public.22 
In the German case, the conditions under which members of the Bundestag must disclose 
sideline jobs did, up to 2005, not require each single sideline activity to be declared and 
published. As a result, former chancellor Helmut Kohl and some of his (likewise former) 
cabinet ministers could – after having returned to the status of ‘ordinary’ MPs upon the end of 
the Kohl administration in 1998 – simply declare sideline activities as ‘management 
consultant’. They were not required to disclose their clients (including e.g. KirchGroup, a big 
German media company at that time), nor the extra income received (e.g. up to EUR 300,000 
per capita and per year). These remained hidden behind the general job declaration 
‘management consultant’.23 Due to a modification of the disclosure rules in October 2005 (the 
start of the 16th legislative term), however, MPs are now legally obliged to disclose all 
activities pursued in addition to their political mandate that fall into the following 
categories:24 
(1) ‘paid activities in addition to the mandate’ as self-employed (e.g. lawyer, business owner, 
farmer) or employee (e.g. manager, attorney, management consultant); 
(2) ‘activities as a member of the management board, supervisory board, administrative 
board, advisory board or another board in a private enterprise’; 
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(3) corresponding activities ‘in local authorities [e.g. member of city/county council] or 
public corporations’ (e.g. member of administrative board of a public savings bank, or 
member of advisory body of a local energy supply company, a public broadcasting 
company, or a regulatory agency); 
(4) ‘activities as a member of the managing board or another leading or advisory board in 
clubs, associations and foundations which are not solely of local significance’ (e.g. 
presidency of an association or charitable foundation); 
(5) ‘agreements on future activities or pecuniary advantages’; 
(6) ‘investments in business companies’ (if MP has a voting share of more than 25%). 
 
The declared sideline activities are subsequently published in the Official Handbook of the 
Bundestag and on its website. Furthermore, MPs must also report to the President of the 
Bundestag, and for each notifiable sideline job in the categories (1) to (5), any ancillary 
income exceeding EUR 1,000 (gross) per month or EUR 10,000 (gross) per year. The 
reported ancillary income is likewise published – which was not the case prior to October 
2005 – although not in exact figures, but merely in the form of three income levels: ‘level 1’ 
(EUR 1,000–3,500), ‘level 2’ (EUR 3,500–7,000), and ‘level 3’ (above EUR 7,000). The MP 
is thereby also free to chose whether she wishes to report a given income stream on an annual 
or monthly basis. For sideline income above EUR 7000 per month, for instance, both the 
publication of ‘per month, level 3’ and ‘per year, level 3’ is thus permissible. 
Importantly, the disclosure regulations in Germany are mandatory. This is not the case in, 
for example, the European Parliament or the parliaments of Norway and Denmark (where the 
system is on a purely voluntary basis). Moreover, violations of the disclosure rules in 
Germany are punishable by a fine of up to half the MPs’ annual salary. This is a fairly strict 
regulation compared to many other parliaments. In the UK House of Commons, for instance, 
the punishment for not reporting is that MPs with unregistered interests ‘shall not undertake 
any action, speech or proceeding of the House (except voting) to which the registration would 
be relevant’ until registration occurs.25 By explicitly excluding MPs’ voting rights – which 
arguably represent a central element of MPs’ influence – such punishment appears rather 
trivial. 
 
What is Disclosed? 
Thanks to the disclosure requirements citizen-principals get to know, for example, that MP 
Friedrich Merz in the period 10/2005–09/2009 held supervisory, administrative and advisory 
posts in eleven private business enterprises. Nine of these yield an outside income of ‘per 
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year, level 3’, leading to a total outside income of at least EUR 63,000 per year.26 MP Anette 
Kramme, to give another example, is disclosed to moonlight as a lawyer, and acted for 290 
clients in the period 10/2005–09/2009 (i.e. six cases per month, on average). Citizens also can 
identify interesting connections. For example, MP Walter Riester, the former labour minister 
(1998–2002) and ‘inventor’ of the state-subsidised private old-age pension insurance (Riester 
Rente), in his post-ministerial life as an ‘ordinary’ MP reports a large number of paid lectures 
for insurance companies and banks which, among other things, sell Riester-Rente-contracts. 
These companies used Riester as a testimonial in their advertisements. 
For readers not familiar with Germany’s political system, it should be mentioned that a 
mandate in the national parliament is designed as a full-time job currently compensated with a 
taxable salary of EUR 7,960 per month, a tax-free allowance for settling mandate-related 
expenses (travel expenditures, constituency office, etc.) in the amount of EUR 4,029 per 
month, and various other (non-)pecuniary components including, for instance, a free ticket for 
rail travels within Germany. In addition, each MP is provided with an allowance of 
EUR 14,712 per month (gross) for the employment of staff (e.g. secretaries, research 
assistants). This allowance can, in principle, also be used to support extra-parliamentary work. 
So, some citizens (especially taxpayers remunerating the Bundestag members) may have an 
interest to investigate how ‘busy’ their MPs are outside parliament. Admittedly, the three 
considered examples from the first cohort of MPs under stricter disclosure rules (i.e. 16th 
legislative term 2005–2009) were not chosen randomly, but often highlighted in the German 
media after the first publication of more detailed moonlighting information. However, citizens 
who invest time and effort to read the register can identify these cases as well. 
Disclosure rules and a register of members’ interests offer citizen-principals the 
opportunity to inform themselves about the outside activities of their political agents. 
Nonetheless, it immediately raises the question how many voters make use of the disclosed 
moonlighting information in order to monitor their representatives. To our knowledge, no 
empirical study has addressed this issue in the German case (or any other parliamentary 
system). Even so, however, it can be expected that many German citizens neither heard of the 
moonlighting register, nor have read through it and used this information source for their 
voting decision. In other words, it is to be expected that many citizens simply are not willing 
to bear the time and effort costs to exploit the available information, and remain rationally 
ignorant in the sense of Downs.27 So, citizens’ direct monitoring activities, which represent an 
important element in the chain of democratic delegation and accountability, are likely to be 
weak. Still, this need not undermine the value of disclosure rules and public moonlighting 
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registries for political accountability as long as the media, impartial observers and academic 
researchers are willing to act as information intermediaries. 
 
 
THIRD-PARTY MONITORING: INFORMATION INTERMEDIARIES 
 
Viewed through the lens of principal-agent theory, journalists, watchdog organisations and 
researchers can serve an important function as information intermediaries.28 Such 
intermediaries may help mitigate the informational asymmetry between citizen-principals and 
their political agents by collecting information (officially disclosed data, own investigations, 
etc.), analysing this material and, eventually, publishing it in a reader-friendly way. Instead of 
reading the register of members’ interests themselves, citizens may thus utilize the 
informational products provided by intermediaries to make better-informed voting decisions. 
Clearly, while intermediaries reduce citizens’ information costs, reading newspaper articles 
and websites containing information about MPs’ conduct is also costly in terms of time and 
effort (being no longer available for other activities). Still, the cost-reduction between 
locating, browsing and reading the registry entries and locating, browsing and reading a 
newspaper article about it (or hearing a news item on television) is probably substantial. 
Moreover, media attention is likely to trigger public discussions (on, say, public transport 
and/or at work). Downs suggests that the ensuing indirect information acquisition greatly 
reduces information costs.29 While he argues that this might make the benefits of voting 
exceed its costs, it might also, in our setting, make more citizens to become informed about 
politicians’ moonlighting (and its consequences). Hence, even though the rational ignorance 
issue will most likely persist to some degree, it is diminished by direct and indirect access to 
information from information intermediaries. 
Yet, reliance on information intermediaries creates an additional principal-agent 
relationship since the citizen (as principal) must evaluate whether a certain intermediary (as 
agent) is a politically independent and reliable source of information.30 Agency theory 
suggests three basic remedies for this credibility problem which, again, can be illustrated by 
means of the German case. 
First, intermediaries may have built up a reputation for being a credible information 
provider. This, in our view, holds for the non-governmental ‘watchdogs’ who have 
specialized in monitoring German MPs’ conduct inside and outside parliament: namely, 
Abgeordnetenwatch (www.abgeordnetenwatch.de), LobbyControl (www.lobbycontrol.de), 
Transparency International Germany (www.transparency.de), and the internet-based 
organisation www.nebeneinkuenfte-bundestag.de. Moreover, when the bias in information-
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provision can be estimated with some degree of accuracy – as may well be the case for 
newspapers known to have certain political sympathies – citizens can make proper adjustment 
for the source of the information. And, while possibly biased, newspapers and other 
intermediaries still need to be concerned about cultivating their own accumulated reputational 
capital – intentionally incorrect information might damage the latter. Second, if there are 
several intermediaries (which is obviously the case in Germany), competition between them 
will cause one intermediary to keep a watchful eye on the informational products of the 
others. This helps to identify and sort out false information. Third, MPs and the Bundestag as 
a whole (represented by the President of the Bundestag and his staff), in their role as the 
actors whose behaviour is monitored, have a strong incentive to clarify incorrect reports by 
information intermediaries. The latter occasionally takes place in Germany, for example, in 
the form of press releases published by the Bundestag. 
 
Extent and Types of Moonlighting 
Though fulfilling an important ‘policing’ function in the political sphere,31 the main drawback 
of the case-by-case approach mostly employed by the media and other watchdogs is that it 
remains unclear whether instances of misconduct are merely individual ‘outliers’, or the tip of 
a greater iceberg. Disclosure rules, however, allow one to go beyond such naming & shaming, 
and offer a good opportunity to analyse the prevalence of moonlighting in more general 
terms. 
Looking in more detail at the moonlighting data for the first cohort of Bundestag members 
subject to stricter disclosure rules (N=613, period 10/2005–09/2007)32 reveals that there are 
considerable differences across MPs with regard to the extent and type of ancillary activities 
as well as the amount of perquisites derived from these activities. 12.4% (76 MPs) by their 
own account have no sideline activities that require publication in the moonlighting register. 
A few parliamentarians exhibit a comparatively large number of ancillary activities (up to 33 
separate posts). In counting such activities, it has to be taken into account that some MPs gave 
a large number of paid lectures. If all activities are just added together, then a single lecture 
gets the same weight as an activity performed for a longer period of time. The same holds for 
a series of entries entitled ‘book presentation’. To account for such ‘lecture-and-presentation 
bias’, we – in our role as information intermediaries – counted a series of single entries 
entitled ‘lectures’ or ‘book presentations’ as one activity. This seems justified because for 
MPs moonlighting as a lawyer or business consultant not every single client was counted as a 
separate sideline job.33 
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After these adjustments, we get the frequency distribution displayed in Figure 1. The 
number of MPs is given on the vertical axis, the number of sideline jobs on the horizontal 
axis. The distribution for the overall number of sideline jobs is represented by the black 
cubes. The total number of ancillary activities for each MP is counted as the sum of activities 
in the above-mentioned register categories (1) through (4) and (6). Category (5) is excluded as 
we are interested in MPs’ current sideline activities (though only one MP declares an activity 
on this category). 
 
-- Figure 1 about here -- 
 
To address the variety in ancillary activities, we separate activities in the private sector of 
the economy from those in the public and political sector. The former is measured by the sum 
of ancillary activities in categories (2) and (6), and adding activities from category (1) when 
the data indicate that the activity is performed in the private sector (e.g. function in private 
business company; job as self-employed lawyer, management consultant, etc.). As a proxy for 
sideline activities in the public sector, the sum of non-political (see below) ancillary activities 
in categories (3) and (4) is taken. Finally, we measure jobs in the political sector by 
calculating the number of political sideline jobs in category (3) (e.g. city/county councillor) 
and category (1) where 49 MPs have to report their paid functions in a political party (e.g. 
party leader, secretary general) or in the federal government (e.g. parliamentary state 
secretary, federal minister).34 In Figure 1 the distributions for sideline jobs in the private, 
public and political sectors are given by the dotted, striped and light-grey cubes, respectively. 
The figure illustrates that sideline jobs are most common in the public sector. It also shows 
that 49.6% (304 MPs) perform no notifiable outside jobs in the private sector of the economy; 
such jobs often give rise to public critique. 
Also, though not shown in detail to preserve space, controlling for a large number of other 
MP-characteristics (age, sex, etc.), a multiple regression analysis reveals that legislators from 
the conservative Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the liberal (in the economic sense) 
Free Democrats (FDP) on average show significantly more sideline activities (both overall 
and in the private sector) than legislators from left-wing parties: Social Democrats (SPD), 
Green Party (Bündnis ‘90/Die Grünen), and the socialist Left Party.35 If the sheer number of 
private-sector activities is taken as a proxy for MPs’ closeness to private-sector interests, then 
CDU/CSU and FDP in fact can be denoted as relatively ‘economic-sector friendly’, as is often 
alleged in the German public debate. 
 - 11 - 
The published moonlighting data further reveal that 72.9% of the parliamentarians (447 
MPs) receive no ancillary income that exceeds EUR 1,000 per month or EUR 10,000 pear 
year – again by their own account. Figure 2 presents the frequency distribution for the 166 
MPs with notifiable ancillary income. For graphical illustration, we calculated their average 
monthly gross outside income and grouped it in eleven income classes: EUR 1–1,000; 
EUR 1,000–2,000; and so forth. While most MPs disclose low levels of ancillary income, the 
amplitude at the income class EUR 6,000–7,000 is striking. This, however, mainly derives 
from the fact that some MPs have a paid sideline job in a political party or in the federal 
government. These are usually remunerated at ‘level 3’ on a monthly basis (above 
EUR 7,000). It is noteworthy that there are also partisan differences with respect to outside 
income. While in the parliamentary groups of CDU/CSU and FDP 35.3% and 32.8% of MPs 
report to receive outside earnings, the left-wing groups show considerably lower outside-
earning rates: SPD (23.0%), Greens (9.8%), and Left Party (18.9%). 
 
-- Figure 2 about here -- 
 
To avoid misunderstandings, below each MP’s entry in the register of interests it is 
stressed that the income declarations ‘do not represent the economic gain from an activity or 
the taxable income’. In other words, the displayed figures do not show the net income from 
moonlighting; and do not account for the fact that a certain sideline activity (e.g. management 
consulting, legal advice) may not only generate (non-)pecuniary benefits, but might also 
involve a considerable amount of cost. Moreover, the data do not provide information about 
the use of outside income. It cannot be ruled out, for instance, that a MP demonstratively 
donates her outside income for charitable purposes. 
Overall, the data presented above stress the obvious, though oft-overlooked, fact that not 
all German politicians have outside jobs, nor earn outside income. Moreover, many outside 
jobs do not generate income (or, at least, not enough to require publication). So, the published 
data can be used to invalidate the popular prejudice/conjecture that the German Bundestag – 
metaphorically speaking – is a herd of ‘black sheep’; or, as an MP put it in the debate before 
the 2005 introduction of stricter disclosure rules: ‘Only a minority of MPs has lucrative 
supervisory board posts or doubtful outside earnings. In the interest of the majority of MPs, 
we need rules and sanctions, which make it possible to identify and, if necessary, punish black 
sheep’.36 Yet, while the official data imply that there may be much ado about little in the 
German moonlighting debate, it must be taken into account that some important information, 
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which would allow to better assess whether the individual MP shirks his parliamentary duties 
and/or may be influenced by outside earnings, remains hidden from the public. 
 
 
LIMITATIONS OF EXISTING ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS 
 
The data published in a register of members’ interests (of the German Bundestag as well as 
other parliaments around the world) allow insight into – and monitoring of – MPs’ activities 
outside parliament. While useful to identify potential and actual conflicts of interests, it is 
clear that informal contacts between MPs and outside interests (e.g. businesses, interest 
groups) are not disclosed by this device. Apart from this natural limitation, there are various 
potential other shortcomings in the existing accountability mechanisms. 
 
Number of Outside Jobs 
One regular drawback of outside interest registers in Germany (and elsewhere) is that citizens 
and other interested parties can most often only observe the number of outside positions. 
Without additional information about (i) the extent of time and effort spent for a single 
outside job and (ii) MPs’ attendance/effort inside parliament, however, it is very difficult to 
assess whether moonlighting affects individual MPs’ parliamentary duties. To our knowledge, 
the UK House of Commons is one of the first parliaments to require more detailed 
information to be provided. Indeed, since July 2009, the Code of Conduct for Members of the 
House of Commons requires publication of the ‘precise amount of each individual payment 
made, the nature of the work carried [out] in return for that payment [and] the number of 
hours worked during the period to which the payment relates’.37 While this makes the UK 
Code of Conduct among the most demanding in its reporting standards, the additional 
information demands clearly remain open to potential self-reporting bias: Will an MP caring 
for her reputation report spending most of her time on outside jobs? As the provided 
information is often very hard to verify, a significant potential for under-reporting ones time-
investment remains. 
Another data limitation in our German setting is that the official attendance list, in which 
MPs have to register each sitting day of the Bundestag, is not made public (we return to this 
below). Yet, the official parliamentary meeting minutes allow identifying MPs not 
participating in a roll-call vote; in addition, since February 2007 individual MPs’ voting 
behaviour is published on the Bundestag website. Although roll-call votes are fairly rare as 
they have to be requested by either a parliamentary fraction or a group of at least 5% of all 
MPs,38 they are sometimes used by journalists and watchdog organisations as a proxy for 
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parliamentary effort. For example, it has recently been revealed that former finance minister 
Steinbrück missed a number of important roll-call votes as an ‘ordinary’ MP (since 09/2009) 
because he was giving remunerated speeches outside parliament.39 
To provide a more general view on this issue, we collected the results of the 64 available 
votes for the period 11/2005–09/2007 (the period for which we have data on extra-
parliamentary activities) and counted the number of votes missed by a given MP. We thereby 
obviously corrected for excused absences due to official journeys (e.g. participation at 
meetings of NATO or Council of Europe) and pregnancy (i.e. maternity leave). We then 
matched this absenteeism rate to the MPs extra-parliamentary activities. This shows that 
having a high number of outside activities is significantly negatively correlated with MPs’ 
participation in recorded votes. More specifically, the pairwise correlation between the 
number of outside jobs and the share of missed votes is 0.0987 (p<0.05). Interestingly, this 
effect appears driven predominantly by outside activities in the private sector (pairwise 
correlation 0.1096; p<0.01), but remains largely absent for political and public-sector sideline 
activities (pairwise correlation 0.0547; p>0.10). This provides suggestive evidence in favour 
of the opportunity-cost argument often made in the moonlighting debate. Unfortunately, since 
the roll-call votes do not address very specific issues, but rather concern general topics, it was 
impossible to identify whether outside employment influences MPs’ actual voting 
behaviour.40 While the latter could be addressed using MPs’ voting behaviour in 
parliamentary committees, it is highly questionable whether such information will be 
published by the Bundestag in the near future (see also below). 
 
Limits of Electoral Control 
Even when citizens take the (limited) information provided by official registers and third-
party watchdogs into account for their voting decision, peculiarities of the voting system may 
limit the mechanism of electoral control. Mitchell, for example, generally notes with respect 
to the voter-MP relationship that ‘agency losses are most likely when the MPs’ careers do not 
directly depend on voters’.41 In the German case, this is probably true for half of the members 
of the national parliament: the so-called party-list MPs (299 in our sample) which – assuming 
that their party re-selects them for a party-list candidature (we return to this crucial point 
below) – cannot directly be voted out of the House by dissatisfied principals. This obviously 
strongly reduces the power of the only weapon voters have to ‘punish’ MPs – i.e. their vote – 
in the chain of democratic delegation and accountability. This problem might become very 
prevalent in completely party-list based systems of proportional representation – such as in 
the Netherlands, Norway, or Belgium. 
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In Germany’s mixed member electoral system, only half of the Bundestag consists of 
directly elected, constituency-based MPs which can be held to account for (perceived) 
misconduct by their voter-principals at the ballot box – assuming their party selects them for 
running as constituency candidate also in the next election (see below). In principle, elections 
are an enforcement tool to hold moonlighting constituency MPs accountable to their voter-
principals. While this especially holds true in fully constituency-based first-past-the-post 
electoral systems such as in the US and UK, it is an empirical (and thus far unexplored) 
question whether this theoretical accountability mechanism is used in practice. Moonlighting 
is, to the best of our knowledge, not even on the list of factors identified in the vast literature 
exploring the determinants of voters’ electoral choices. Is it plausible, for instance, to think 
that right-of-centre voters in Germany would switch to a constituency candidate from the ‘left 
camp’ in order to punish moonlighting by an incumbent MP from the CDU/CSU and FDP 
(where it is most common) or vice versa? 
While the assumption that citizens would use their precious votes first and foremost to hold 
their constituency MPs accountable for moonlighting is a very demanding one, there is 
another (competing) principal with an incentive to take a critical look at constituency-based 
and party-list MPs’ moonlighting activities: i.e. the MP’s political party may fear that its 
reputation may become damaged by the MP’s misconduct. In this case, some retribution for 
misconduct does occur, although it is not meted out by voters directly. Such partisan 
retribution may happen internally and covertly during a legislative term and/or by refusing a 
particular MP a place on the respective party’s ticket (i.e. either a party-list and/or a 
constituency candidature). Mitchell argues that ‘in this situation, the party polices its members 
and offers its brand identity to voters’.42 Still, for this to work effectively as an additional 
safeguard against moral-hazard problems, much depends on the value the party attaches to its 
‘brand name’, and how the party expects individual MPs’ misconduct to affect the party’s 
reputation. 
While it has long been argued by both economists and political scientists that political 
parties develop a reputation for particular policy positions43 and that this provides low-cost 
information to voters about the politicians associated with these parties,44 less is known about 
whether membership of a given party can also be ‘one of the signals that voters use when 
estimating the “quality” of political representatives’.45 Yet, for electoral considerations, the 
wish to have an untainted partisan reputation might create the necessary strategic incentives 
for instilling constraints on party members (especially those pursuing a political career within 
the party).46 In this respect, it is interesting to observe that party-list MPs in Germany (who do 
not have to ‘fight’ to please/win a constituency) do not exhibit significantly more outside 
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activities than directly elected MPs.47 One explanation for this might be that MPs with a list-
mandate in practice are often committed by their respective parties to care for a constituency 
or a region in Germany.48 Hence, some form of accountability is apparently retained. 
Alternatively, it could signal that party discipline in Germany – even though less 
institutionalised than, for instance, in the UK – is sufficient to constrain rank-and-file party 
members that are not subject to direct electoral retribution by voters. 
 
Self-Reported Moonlighting Data 
The chain of democratic delegation and accountability may furthermore be impaired when 
there remain serious doubts about whether the disclosure rules reveal the ‘true’ amount of 
outside interests/earnings. Similar to most other countries with disclosure rules, the 
information published in the German register of members’ interests is self-reported. MPs 
periodically have to report the requested information via a standardised questionnaire to the 
President of the Bundestag. Similarly, in the UK, MPs’ interests must be reported within four 
weeks of the start of the activity or within a month from a politician’s election into the 
House.49 While we implicitly assumed above that the information provided is correct, this is 
not self-evident – as shown by various cases where journalists’ and watchdog organisations’ 
investigations revealed that MPs did not report notifiable outside jobs/income.50 
More specific to the German setting, MPs are free to indicate whether they reach a 
particular outside income level on a monthly or yearly basis. This can easily be exploited to 
‘game’ the income-level system. One striking example – reported by the internet-based 
watchdog organisation www.nebeneinkuenfte-bundestag.de (accessed 1 February 2012) – is 
that of MP Bodewig. On 6 July 2007, he reported ancillary revenues from KPMG and Abellio 
GmbH amounting to ‘level 2, per month’ for each firm. On 2 August 2007, this report was 
changed into ‘level 3, per year’ in both cases. While both income declarations meet the 
disclosure requirements, the July declaration suggests extra income of at least EUR 84,000 
per year (i.e. 2 x EUR 3,500 x 12), while the August declaration reveals only EUR 14,000 per 
year (i.e. 2 x EUR 7,000). Interestingly, the outside-income data were published on the 
Bundestag’s website on 5 July 2007 for the first time (after the 2005 legislative change). The 
public debate ensuing this publication might have led to the remarkable change in MP 
Bodewig’s income declarations. 
Clearly, however, similar problems will arise wherever self-reporting is adhered to, and 
politicians have some chance to ‘hide’ income. While in the UK very detailed data on income 
from outside interests are required to be reported since July 2009 (see above), many states in 
the US report outside income in much the same way as Germany.51 As a result, discrepancies 
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between the self-declared and the true amount of outside income are reported for other 
parliaments as well. Djankov et al., for instance, report recent newspaper accounts on MPs 
failing to accurately disclose the required information in over 20 countries; impressive 
examples are presented from Argentina, Puerto Rico, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States.52 
 
Non-Transparent Outside Income 
Since the income-level system applied by the German Bundestag (similar to various US 
states) does not reveal the exact amount of MPs’ discretionary earnings to the public, it leaves 
wide room for speculation: Are the lower limits of the income bands (i.e. EUR 1,000–3,500; 
EUR 3,500–7,000; over EUR 7000) exceeded? If so, by how far? Moreover, the German 
system veils additional income from outside jobs notified in MPs’ register entries falling 
below the limit of EUR 1,000 per month or EUR 10,000 per year – as no income publication 
is required in these cases. Paid lectures, expert opinions or journalistic activities do not have 
to be notified at all if the income from such an activity does not exceed the just-mentioned 
thresholds. Particularly problematic is the open-ended ‘level 3’ (= over EUR 7,000). For 
example, according to the moonlighting register MP Merz (see above) receives an additional 
income of at least EUR 63,000 per year for supervisory, administrative and advisory posts in 
nine private business enterprises. Each of these activities is labelled as ‘per year, level 3’ 
(9 x EUR 7,000). Yet, a journalist requesting the underlying information from the employers 
declared by Merz revealed that the nine sideline jobs in 2006 generated an additional income 
of approximately EUR 250,000.53 Clearly, therefore, this declaration-system puts a 
considerable veil of non-transparency over ancillary income. 
This is likewise not a peculiarity of the German Bundestag, but can be observed in other 
parliaments as well.54 Against this background, it is easy to engage in normative arguments to 
fully disclose outside income – in line with the recently instituted UK system.55 Whether 
policy proposals in this direction – which have been made by von Arnim,56 the German Green 
Party, Transparency International, and other scholars and non-governmental organisations – 
have any chance of success is another question. We will return to the difficulties of changing 
the rules of the moonlighting game in the next and final section. Interestingly, some 
Bundestag members started to voluntarily disclose their exact revenues (including outside 
earnings) and expenditures on their websites. Through this trust-building measure they, in the 
language of agency theory, intend to signal to voters and other observers that they are honest 
politicians. Although it is by no means clear that such signal always is a credible one, 
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individual MPs’ and parties’ worries about their reputational capital57 may work as an 
additional safeguard against moral-hazard problems. 
 
 
CONCLUSION: ENDURING AGENCY PROBLEMS – WHAT COULD BE DONE? 
 
Our case study of the German national parliament has demonstrated that theoretically 
promising accountability mechanisms of disclosure (of moonlighting activities) and electoral 
control are often impaired in real-world settings. This likewise holds in many other advanced 
democracies, as the recent developments in the Austrian and European Parliament illustrate.58 
From an agency-theory perspective, a number of simple measures may mitigate the 
informational deficits that endure. For instance, in each MP’s entry on the Bundestag website, 
one should find (at least) the following additional information: full extent of outside earnings, 
attendance in parliament and parliamentary committees, participation/voting in roll-call votes. 
Although, to the best of our knowledge, full earnings data are only to be provided by British 
MPs (since July 2009),59 attendance and vote data are usually, at best, collected and made 
public through non-profit websites such as www.publicwhip.org.uk. Nonetheless, the 
information in a MP’s ‘scorecard’ could be used by citizen-principals, journalists, party 
officials, researchers, and other interested parties to scrutinise whether moonlighting de facto 
affects individual legislators’ parliamentary duties and votes. 
Though, in principle, easy enough to accomplish, the implementation of this proposal may 
be wishful thinking. As MPs themselves have the power to introduce and/or modify 
disclosure rules, the rules of the game are effectively made/modified by those playing under 
these rules. Consequently, loopholes and ‘grey zones’60 are likely to continue to abound – 
leading to enduring secrecy and non-transparency. Nevertheless, as recent experiences in 
Austria, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the European Parliament indicate, the 
accumulation of more or less ‘scandalous’ individual cases exerts pressure on politicians and 
might trigger stricter rules.61 Problem pressure in this context often becomes visible via polls: 
following scandals with moonlighting politicians and politicians’ retirement/redundancy 
payments in Germany, for example, an Infratest Poll in February 2005 (i.e. some months 
before the implementation of stricter disclosure requirements) indicated an all-time low share 
of citizens (i.e. 17%) trusting their MPs.62 
It should be clear, however, that we have to live with some ‘quasi-natural’ limitations of 
disclosure rules. Political agents acting ‘opportunistically’ in the sense of Williamson (‘self-
interest seeking with guile [including e.g.] lying, stealing and cheating’)63 will most likely 
find ways to ‘game’ any disclosure system.64 Moreover, as noted earlier, an official obligation 
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to disclose outside jobs fails to reveal MPs’ informal contacts with businesses or interest 
groups. MPs in Germany and other Western societies must, however, consider that such 
contacts might be uncovered by journalists, political opponents, or other critical observers. 
Apart from the stressed limitations of monitoring by citizen-principals and third-parties, it is 
clear that the mechanism of electoral punishment may be impeded by peculiarities of the 
voting system. For example, (perceived) misconduct by party-list Bundestag members cannot 
be directly punished by voters in the next election. Constituency MPs can be punished – but it 
may well be doubted that dissatisfaction with a particular MP is stronger than the respective 
voter’s partisan orientation. 
Finally, an apparently simple – and regularly voiced – solution to prevent any potential 
moral-hazard problems due to legislators’ moonlighting is to prohibit this practice. This 
would make citizens’ and third parties’ monitoring activities unnecessary. Similarly, 
legislation might be implemented which (i) declares only certain sideline jobs as incompatible 
with the political mandate; (ii) limits the time allowed for moonlighting activities; and/or (iii) 
limits the outside income received from such activities. Yet, apart from raising additional 
issues (which outside jobs should be prohibited? how much moonlighting/outside income is 
too much?) and the difficulty to change existing rules of the game (see above), the 
implementation of such rules may have important side-effects. First, such rules may restrict, 
or prevent, real-world experience to find its way into parliament, and thereby negatively affect 
the democratic decision-making process.65 Second, such bans may have important 
repercussions in terms of individuals’ (self-)selection into politics.66 For example, a political 
mandate may be unattractive for highly-qualified people whose pre-MP income exceeds their 
current MP-salary (and would desire outside income to balance this wage gap). Whether the 
limitation or prohibition of moonlighting in fact engenders the conjectured incentive and 
selection effects, of course, would have to be tested empirically. 
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FIGURE 1: Frequency Distribution of Sideline Jobs, 10/2005–09/2007 (N=613) 
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Note: Own illustration based on official data from German Bundestag. 
 
FIGURE 2: Frequency Distribution of Outside Income, 10/2005–09/2007 (N=166) 
 
Notes: Own illustration based on official data from German Bundestag. 447 MPs do not declare any outside 
income, and are not taken up in Figure 2. 
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